The rekindled discourse surrounding Kachchativu (K) has once again captured attention. India's External Affairs Minister, Jaishankar, highlighted a pivotal historical moment: in 1974, during the delineation of the Marine Boundary, Kachchativu found itself on Sri Lanka's side. However, within a mere two years, another pact was forged between India and Sri Lanka, curtailing Indian fishermen's access to traditional waters—a stark departure from the allowances of 1974. According to Jaishankar, these agreements, in essence, amounted to treachery, as India purportedly relinquished both the island and fishing rights.
Evidently, India's stance refutes any notion of benevolent bestowal or concession towards Sri Lanka. Historical sovereignty over Kachchativu lay firmly with Sri Lanka, a fact substantiated by centuries-old claims. Remarkably, archival records unveil a significant historical precedent: a pivotal fishing conference convened a century ago, in 1921, under colonial dominion. At this juncture, amidst concerns of over-exploitation and the imperative of maritime conservation, both Madras and Ceylon—then British territories—agreed upon the imperative of delineating maritime boundaries.
Intriguingly, WT Jayasinghe's seminal work, "Kachchativu and the Maritime Boundary of Sri Lanka," meticulously chronicles the 1921 deliberations. Notably, the principle of equidistance and the median line emerged as guiding tenets for boundary demarcation. Mr. Cotton, representing the Indian delegation, underscored a pivotal agreement: the delineation line, with mutual concurrence, rested three miles west of Kachchativu. Furthermore, he emphasized a pragmatic view regarding Ceylon's claim to the island—a sentiment primarily steeped in emotion rather than practicality.
Thus, the historical fabric woven around Kachchativu transcends mere diplomatic discourse—it is a narrative etched with geopolitical nuances, colonial legacies, and the imperative of resource management.
In the annals of history, a pivotal meeting convened in 1921 sheds profound light on the contentious issue of Kachchativu (K). Within the confines of this gathering, the Indian representative articulated the Rajah of Ramnad's claim over K, asserting its inclusion within his Zamindari. However, the Ceylon delegation, led by Horsburg, countered, adamantly proclaiming Kachchativu as Ceylonese territory. This assertion was bolstered by correspondence with the Government of India, affirming Ceylon's unequivocal claim to possession.
The proceedings of this epochal meeting, meticulously chronicled by WT Jayasinghe, unveil a series of critical agreements. Firstly, amidst deliberations, a unanimous consensus emerged on the delineation line for the Palk Strait and Gulf of Mannar: three miles west of Kachchativu. However, crucially, the Indian representatives appended a caveat to this agreement, reserving India's right to assert territorial claims over Kachchativu—an aspect underscored in the proceedings of the Department of Commerce meeting.
Throughout the colonial epoch, India refrained from staking explicit ownership over Kachchativu, tacitly accepting the boundary line delineated three miles west of the island. This historical precedent, perhaps, elucidates the Central Government of India's stance in subsequent legal proceedings. When Tamil Nadu sought judicial recourse, the Central Government, unequivocally, attested that Kachchativu was never ceded to Sri Lanka as a gesture of goodwill, thereby negating any grounds for reclamation.
Furthermore, the methodology behind the three-mile demarcation warrants examination. While an equidistant principle would have situated the boundary midpoint seven and a half miles west of Kachchativu—favorable to Sri Lanka—Horsburg proposed a more equitable solution. By advocating for a mere three-mile westward delineation, Horsburg sought to balance the fishing rights of both nations—a concession aimed at fostering amicable settlement.
Thus, the discourse surrounding Kachchativu is steeped in a complex interplay of historical assertions, diplomatic maneuvering, and pragmatic concessions—a narrative that continues to shape Indo-Sri Lankan relations to this day.
The saga of Kachchativu gradually evolved into a multifaceted national security concern, compounded by illicit immigration and smuggling endeavors originating from South India, exploiting Kachchativu as a strategic base. In response, Sri Lanka established a Task Force to Prevent Illicit Immigration (TAFII), unearthing a significant revelation: a substantial number of illicit immigrants apprehended in Jaffna confessed to transiting through Kachchativu. This emergent security challenge underscored the urgency voiced by Mrs. Bandaranaike to address the Kachchativu issue, ultimately culminating in the landmark 1974 Agreement between the two nations.
However, a closer examination of the 1974 Agreement reveals a disconcerting development regarding fishing rights. The delineation line, originally set at three miles west of Kachchativu, was inexplicably reduced to a mere one mile, resulting in a substantial loss of sea territory for Sri Lanka—an outcome contrary to its national interests. This discrepancy raises pertinent questions about Sri Lanka's strategic negotiating stance and its failure to leverage international legal doctrines, such as the Doctrine of Uti Possidetis, which upholds colonial boundaries as international borders upon independence.
Indeed, the International Court of Justice's ruling in the Mali-Burkina Faso dispute underscores the applicability of Uti Possidetis in decolonization scenarios, irrespective of the legal or political status of the entities involved. Sri Lanka could have leveraged this legal principle to safeguard its territorial integrity, yet inexplicably acceded to a reduction in the delineation line, diminishing its sovereignty over a vast maritime expanse—an outcome that defies comprehension.
Furthermore, Article 5 of the 1974 Agreement stipulates restricted rights for Indian fishermen and pilgrims to access Kachchativu without formal travel documentation. However, these rights are strictly limited to non-fishing activities such as net drying, sail/boat repairs, and resting—contrary to assertions that fishing rights were granted in the 1974 Agreement. Consequently, the notion that fishing rights were forfeited in a subsequent 1976 agreement is erroneous, as the 1974 Agreement never extended such privileges to Indian fishermen within Sri Lankan waters.
In essence, the complexities surrounding the Kachchativu Agreement epitomize a delicate balance between national security imperatives, diplomatic negotiations, and adherence to international legal principles—a saga underscored by missed opportunities, strategic oversights, and enduring repercussions on Indo-Sri Lankan relations.
The intricate dynamics surrounding Kachchativu negotiations in 1974 reveal India's persistent efforts to assert its claim over the island. According to Jayasinghe, discussions with relevant officials ensued prior to the final agreement, with India staunchly advocating for its claim to Kachchativu. Kewal Singh, then Foreign Secretary of India, tirelessly justified India's stance, even proposing the notion of concurrent jurisdiction at one point.
The Sri Lankan delegation countered India's claims by presenting historical evidence, including Dutch records listing Kachchativu as part of the territories of Jaffna. Additionally, they referenced Francois Valentyn's map in "Description of the Island of Ceylon," which clearly depicted Kachchativu within Ceylonese territory. Moreover, census records up to 1955 listed Kachchativu as a village in the Northern Province, and Indian government records revealed requests to the Sri Lankan government for permission to conduct naval bombardment practice on Kachchativu for the Royal Indian Navy.
The 1976 agreement, on the other hand, primarily addressed the Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), Continental Shelf, and associated resources following the Law of the Sea convention. Both nations agreed to refrain from fishing in each other's historic waters, territorial seas, and EEZs. Of particular significance was the inclusion of the Wedge Bank, a lucrative fishing ground situated 22 miles off Cape Comorin, initially falling outside India's territorial waters. Despite Sri Lankan fishermen historically accessing the Wedge Bank, the agreement placed restrictions on their activities, with India reserving the right to explore petroleum and mineral resources in the area.
However, despite the agreements, Indian fishermen persist in illegal fishing practices within Sri Lankan waters. Jaishankar revealed staggering statistics of Indian fishermen detained and boats seized by the Sri Lankan Navy, emphasizing incursions well beyond the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) into Sri Lanka's territorial waters, including areas such as Pt Pedro and Mullaitivu. These fishermen engage in banned practices like bottom trawling, causing irreparable damage to marine ecosystems and depriving Northern Tamil fishermen of their livelihoods.
Thus, the Kachchativu negotiations and subsequent agreements underscore a complex interplay of historical claims, legal doctrines, and ongoing challenges in maritime governance and enforcement, leaving Northern Tamil fishermen caught in the crosscurrents of geopolitical tensions and livelihood imperatives.
Recent revelations from the "Parliamentary Sectoral Oversight Committee on Alleviating the Economic Crisis" shed light on the staggering economic impact of Indian fishermen's incursions into Sri Lankan territorial waters—a harvest estimated at a staggering $2 billion worth of fish annually. Prime Minister Modi's exhortation for the Sri Lankan government to prioritize the self-respect and welfare of Northern Tamils raises pertinent questions about the plight of Sri Lankan Tamils whose livelihoods are jeopardized by these incursions.
Indeed, the persistent poaching activities, if left unchecked, portend ecological devastation, rendering the marine ecosystem barren and depleted. Sri Lanka must, therefore, bolster its legal and regulatory frameworks to combat this menace effectively.
Turning to the issue of Kachchativu, echoes of Jawaharlal Nehru's and Indira Gandhi's dismissive remarks—labeling it a "small island" and a "waste of time discussing"—resonate. Despite its barren and uninhabited nature, Kachchativu unequivocally belongs to Sri Lanka, with the International Maritime Boundary Line (IMBL) drawn one mile west of the island. Any unauthorized crossing of this boundary or exploitation of its resources warrants legal intervention—a stance that any law-abiding individual would endorse.
In essence, while Kachchativu may hold little intrinsic value, its significance lies in upholding Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity. Thus, robust legal measures must be enforced to safeguard against encroachments and resource exploitation, ensuring that the rights and interests of Sri Lankan citizens, particularly those in the Northern region, are duly protected.
In conclusion, the saga of Kachchativu encapsulates a myriad of complexities—from economic exploitation to ecological concerns and questions of sovereignty. The incursions of Indian fishermen into Sri Lankan waters pose a significant threat to the livelihoods of local fishermen and the sustainability of marine resources. As Sri Lanka grapples with these challenges, it is imperative to bolster legal and regulatory measures to protect its territorial integrity and ensure the welfare of its citizens, particularly those in the Northern region.
Moreover, while Kachchativu may seem inconsequential in terms of its size and natural resources, its symbolic significance cannot be understated. It stands as a testament to Sri Lanka's sovereignty and its ability to assert control over its territorial waters. By upholding the International Maritime Boundary Line and enforcing laws against unauthorized crossings and resource exploitation, Sri Lanka reaffirms its commitment to preserving its rights and interests.
Ultimately, the resolution of the Kachchativu issue requires a delicate balance between diplomatic negotiations, legal frameworks, and socio-economic considerations. As both countries navigate these complexities, it is essential to prioritize dialogue, cooperation, and mutual respect to forge sustainable solutions that benefit all parties involved. Only through concerted efforts can the region achieve lasting peace, prosperity, and environmental sustainability for future generations.